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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * * * *

** **** **

MICHAEL W. STRAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 16176

JACK CRANNEY, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

* * ** *

STATEMENT
The appellant submits the following reply brief pursuant to Rule
75(p) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant contends

that the respondents have raised two issues in their brief on appeal
that warrant a reply brief.

The respondents have contended that

even if the trial court's findings will not support respondents'
contention in the trial court that a joint tenancy arrangement
existed between appellant and respondent with reference to the
Classic Mining Company s~ock, that respondent at least has a cotenancy arrangement in said stock.

Second, respondent contends that

since the transaction in this case was in the nature of replevin as
initially maintained by the appellant that appellant has the burden
of proof in the instant action.

It is submitted that with reference
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to both matter• respondent is in error and that one of these contention• wa1 not properly before the Court having been raised for the
flr1t time on appeal.

POINT I
APPELLANT HAS NO COTENANCY INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY OF CLASSIC MINING STOCK SINCE, (l) THE
PLEA OF COTENANCY IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL AND (2) THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR SUCH
CLAIM.
In Point II of the respondent's brief on appeal, it is asserted
that even if the trial court's findings on a joint venture relationlhlp between appellant and respondent are erroneous that this Court
could affirm the judgment below based upon a theory that there was
1ome form of cotenancy or joint ownership in the stock between the
appellant

an~

respondent.

It is respectfully submitted that such a

contention cannot be sustained.

Appellant submits that if the Court

were to find no joint venture relationship between the appellant and
respondent the only other relationship cognizable from the posture
of the case is that of a contractual relationship between the
parties of borrower/lender.
Appellant filed his verified complaint alleging that there were
a series
appellant
(R. 2-~).

~i

loans

pled~ed

betw~en

appellant and respondents for which the

the stock which was the

s~bject

of the complaint

It was appellant's contention that appellant had

stock as security for loans from
were wron(fully

retdinin~

the

respo~Jents

pled~e

(R.

pled~~d

and thJt responjents

2-~l.

ResponJen~s

file·l
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stock as the original relationship between appellant and
(R. 39).

Respondents plead as an affirmative defense to

tiff's claim for relief the joint venture relationship asserted Ia
the trial court (R. 40).

The respondents' counterclaim alao alle&ed

the creation of a joint venture relationship between appellant aad
respondents and respondents' prayer for relief was based on a contention of a joint venture (R. 41-43).

The amended findinga of fact

and conclusions of law as entered by the court treated only the
claim of a joint venture relationship (R. 114).

At no time did the

respondents assert in the trial court, either in their pleadinga,
evidence, or argument, that their assertions of the right to own and
possess the stock in question was based on any other legal theory
than one of joint venture.

The record is devoid of any contention

of a joint tenancy or tenancy in common relationship in the stock
other than that emanating from the claim of joint venture.

It is,

therefore, submitted that respondents cannot now for the first time
on appeal contend that if the trial court erred in finding a joint
venture relationship that the judgment below can be sustained on the
basis of a joint ownership either by joint tenancy or tenancy in
common.

In In re Estate of Ekker, 19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.:ld 45

(1967), this Court observed, citing several prior decisions:
"Neither of the first two points were raised
in the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial.
Therefore, they cannot be considered for the
first time on this appeal."
This Court has consistently followed the position that where matters
have

not been raised in the pleading or a part of the record in the
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trial court they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,
Hanover Limited v. Field, 568 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977); Nelson v.
Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978); Park City, Utah Corp. v. Ensign
Company, 586 P.2d 446 (Utah 1978).

It is therefore submitted that

respondents' contention in Point II of their brief on appeal cannot
be sustained since the issue was not properly raised and preserved
la the court below.

It is further submitted that the evidence in the instant case
will not support this Court's recognition of either a co-ownership
in the nature of a joint tenancy or tenancy in common.
This Court has recognized that joint tenancies are basically
creatures of contract.

(1966).

Hanks v. Hales, 17 Utah 2d 344, 411 P.2d 836

It has been generally recognized that joint tenancy inter-

eats can only be created by "grant or devise and never by way of
dissent or

oth~r

act of law."

Ownership, §9. p. 100.

20 Am.Jur.2d Cotenancy and Joint

Therefore, unless there was so'!le actual

intention on the pdrt of appellant dnd respondents to create a joint
tenancy interest none can be created by an incidental legal relationship.

It has been stated that before a joint tenancy in

property can be realized that there are four essential elements or
unities.

In 20 A:n.Jur.2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, §4, it is

stated:
"In other ·.,ords, rhere ::Just be the follo·.,in~ four
(lJ ~nity of interest, (2) unity of
unity of ti:-ne, Jnd (-.) :Jnicy of
possession. If anv one of tnese ele~ents is
l d c ~ i nh . the est .1 t ~ .,,. i l 1 n c)[ l' e one i n J o in t

uniti~s:
title, (J)

tenJn2:'·

~,

..l:: q -__.; l :- e 3 n
dilfe~(·nt t

n2e,

.~he~e

t~o

or

~-)~e

oe~so~s

n ~ i '.' 1 1 '"' : l

;nc~

,):-

i : l . · :- e ~ ~ l ;) ;. ~ ) :: ·:> :- c: ·; .J :
Jy Ji~-:-t.':-e~.t c,_':l\'e:.·.ln~t::'S, :.:--~-::
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estate created is not joint tenancy, for the
unity of time or the unity of conveyance would be
disregarded were this to be called a joint
tenancy."
See Hanks v. Hales. supra.

In the instant case, it is clear that

there is no unity of time or possession and that the various transactions where characterized as loans or part of a joint venture
occurred over an extended period of time.

It is equally apparent

that there was never intended by either appellant or respondent any
relationship comparable to that of
in the stock.

~

tenancy or joint ownership

It is apparent that if there was no joint venture,

the contract and relationship is significantly deficient, based on
the instant record, to make out a claim of joint tenancy.

Further,

rhe burden would be upon the respondents to establish a joint
tenancy by "clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence", 20
Am.Jur.2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, §9, p. 101.
It is further submitted that there is no co-ownership in the
nature of a cotenancy or tenancy in common.

It is well settled that

stock or other personal property may be handed over to the possession of a third person as a pledge.

Johnson v. Hibbard, 27 Utah 342,

75 Pac. 737 (1904); Brown, Personal Property, §128, p 566.

This

does not create a cotenancy and will terminate a joint tenancy.
~.Jur.2d

be

Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, §17.

20

In order for there to

a cotenancy or a tenancy in common, there must be a unity of

pJssession, 20 Am.Jur.2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, §§1, 23.
lons as property is pledged or in the possession of another person
L;r

se-:urity no cotenancy or tenancy in common is created.

Only
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As

where there is • contr•ctu•l rel•tionship or a relationship intend-

in& to convey ownership would such a relationship be created.

If

the evidence is insufficient to establish a joint venture then the
only evidence of record supporting any relationship between appell•nt •nd respondents supports the appellant's contention that the
rel•tionship w•s one of borrower/secured creditor.

The facts in the

inst•nt c•se do not show that there was any contractual borrowing or
de•ling th•t would give rise to a cl•im of co-ownership.

Although

there w•s discussion concerning creation of a partnership relationship between the parties, the matter only involved preliminary
discussion and was never consummated.

Respondents simply held

possession of the stock as pledgees to secure their loan.

Respond-

ents are entitled to the monies they advanced plus interest but
nothing else.
POINT II
RESPONDENTS HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING A JOINT
VENTURE RELATIONSHIP AND THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO
SUPPORT RESPONDENTS' BURDEN OF PROOF.
In Point III of respondents' brief they assert that the burden
of proof was on the appellant to establish his right to possession
of the stock, citing general statements from cases with reference to
the law of replevin.

In order to determine the appropriate burden

of proof in the instant case, it is essential to analyze the pleadings of the parties.

The appellant filed the initial action and his

verified complaint plead that the stock in question was given as a
pled~e for loans made by respondents and that the respondents wror<-

fully retJined the pled~e (R. 2-4).

The answer and cou~terclJi~ n'
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the respondents is particularly significant aa to the
proof (R. 39).

bu~dea

The answer in affirmative (firat)

that the appellants loaned Strand the sum of $20,000 and

furtlle~

,,. ,

admits the receipt of 10,000 shares of Classic Minin& Corporatloa
from Strand.

Further, averments throughout the pleadln&• adalt tbat

Strand turned over the stock in question in one form or eaotber to
the respondents as part of their business arrangement• (1. 39-41).
The pleadings and evidence show appellant's willingnesa to extinguish the debt and interest in obtaining release of the pledged
stock not sold by respondents.

In Paragraph 6 of reapondenta'

answer, they assert a transaction as being part of the conteaplation
of a joint venture arrangement (R. 40).

In appellant's counter-

claim, an allegation is made that a joint venture arrang ... nt waa
entered into on May 4, 1977, and the counterclaim further aaaerts a
joint venture arrangement as being a defense to the appellant's
contentions and justifying the actions and claims of respondents.
Therefore, the posture of the pleadings was to recognize that the
stock in question was turned over to respondents by Strand and that
Strand had at least a possessory interest in the stock and respondents af:irmatively asserted a joint venture relationship as a
defense to the contentions advanced by Strand.

Under these circum-

stances, it is submitted that the burden of'proof to establish the
joint venture relationship was clearly upon respondents.
brings into consideration maxims of burden of proof.
phrase

~

incurnbit probatio

~

dicit;

~

This case

The Latin

gui negat is generally

applied as to the burden of proof and simply means that "the proof
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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llel upon him who affirms, not upon him who denies", Black's Law
Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 606.

lli.2!. 11 allo applicable.

Another maxim, ~ excipiendo fit

This phrase provides that "the defendant,

bJ excepting or pleading, becomes a plaintiff", Black's Law Diction-

!!l• 4th Ed., p. 1482.

As asserted in the same work where a party,

in1tead of simply denying the plaintiff's cause of action, sets up
1ome new matter in defen9e, the party bears the burden of proof.
Thua, under these principles, respondents had the burden of proof.
The rules for allocating burdens of proof are succinctly stated
in James & Haz3rd, Civil Procedure, 2d ed. §7.8, where it is
atated:

"* •

*

the party who must establish the affirmative

proposition has the burden of proof on the issue", (2)

"* * *

that

the burden of proof is upon the party to whose case the fact in
question is essential * * *" and (3) "*

* * the party who has the

burden of pleading a fact must prove it ...

Applying each of the

above principles, it is apparent that the burden of persuasion in
the instant case, as to the joint venture relationship, was on the
respondents on their

counterclai~.

The evidence was clearly to the

effect that the stock in question was lawfully possessed by Strand
and either given over to respondents as a pledge for loans or as
part of a joint venture relationship.
receipt of the stock,

ackno~ledge

Res?ondents acknowledge

some loan transactions and

affirmatively plead a joint venture relationshi?.
oi persuasion, once it
in the

sto~~

anj that

the respondt'nts to

wdS

so~u

Thus, the

burde~

established th.lt Strand had an interest
of the

est.JtJlts:-~

transacti~~s

~ere

loans,

~as

their jo;n: ven:ure contention.
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In 46 Am.Jur.2d Joint Ventures, S69, the general rule Ia
stated:

"The burden of establishing the existence of a joint

venture is upon the party asserting the relation exist1."

It

generally recognized rule that a joint venture il never preauaed ...
that the burden of persuasion is on the party alleging 1ucb a relationship.

Preston v. The State Industrial Accident Com.i11loa, 174

Or. 553, 149 P.2d 957 (1944); Bunn v. Lucas, Pino,

Cal.App.2d 450, 342 P.2d 508 (1959).

& Luca1, 172

The standard Ia no different

regardless of how the appellant's original claim for relief 11
characterized.

Although appellant did not proceed in accordance

with the replevin rules (see Rule 65b, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) appellant's claim for relief in part was for the return of the
remaining available stock.

Even if this is characterized as an

action in replevin, the right of the appellant to an interest in the
stock is recognized in the respondents' answer and counterclaim.
Therefore, the rule stated in 66 Am.Jur.2d Replevin S98 is applicable:
"In case tbe defendant does not deny the allegations of the complaint, but relies entirely on an
affirmative defense, the burden is on him
throughout to establish his defenses."
Consequently, it is submitted that the burden of persuasion for
tne respondents to prevail below was on the respondents.

For the

reasons stated in appellant's original brief, that burden was not
met.

The evidence simply does not conform to the legal requirements

f0r a joint venture and is insufficient to support the trial court's
findings .
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CONCLUSION
lt Ia respectfully submitted that the assertions in the respondents' brief to the effect that if the trial court's conclusions were
incorrect as to a joint venture that a cotenancy relationship can be
sustained and that the appellant had the burden of proof on the
iaaue of whether the respondent should prevail are incorrect stateaents of law.

There is no basis to claim any relationship between

the parties other than those encompassed within the parties'
pleadings and evidence offered of record.

On the right of the

respondents to have an ownership interest in the stock sought by
appellant in bringing the instant action, respondents bore the
burden of establishing a joint venture relationship and as set forth
in the appellant's principal brief on appeal, the evidence does not
aupport the trial court's findings.

This Court should reverse.

Respectfully submitted

RICHARD J. LEEDY
610 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Appellant
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